Abstract: Using survey data collected in 1995 and 2000, we reported that academic economists were allocating more time to teaching even though departmental and school incentives (promotion and tenure as well as annual raises) provided a clear premium for research. Revisiting this issue using 2005 survey data collected by Watts and Becker (2006), we find that the research premium persists and has become even stronger at Ph.D.-granting institutions. Although the overall samples of academic economists have not made major changes in their allocation of work time over the past decade in response to the incentives, there have been different responses at different types of schools. At doctoral schools more time is being spent on research, while at master's and baccalaureate schools more time is being devoted to teaching.
In all three surveys -1995, 2000, and 2005 -fixed-interval sampling was used to identify the questionnaire recipients from the respective source lists. In 1995 the response rate was 21 percent, in 2000 it was 19 percent, and in 2005 it was 13 percent. Results from all three surveys are based on opportunistic samples and self-reported data. There is no way of knowing whether respondents are representative of all U.S. teachers of undergraduate economics courses, but our intuition is that those with greater interest in teaching were more likely to complete and return the questionnaire. Even if this is the case, it is not clear that would lead to a predictable bias in responses to the questions of most interest in this paper. For example, instructors who are more interested in teaching might be likely to report higher percentages of time spent on teaching and higher weights on teaching for annual raise and promotion/tenure decisions because they have found positions that reward their interest in teaching, either at departments and schools that emphasize good teaching or working as "teaching specialists" in more research-oriented departments. On the other hand, they might report higher percentages and weights on research if they feel that the research demands they face at their schools are excessive. Consequently, we have not attempted to adjust or control for any possible bias resulting from sample selection issues. Our major interest here is in comparing responses from the three different years in which the surveys were conducted.
FACULTY TIME ALLOCATIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL INCENTIVES
Definitions for variables -indicating the percentage of time instructors report spending in teaching, research, and service, and the weightings these same respondents feel their institutions assign to these activities in awarding annual raises or promotion and tenure -are reported in Academic economists still spend a little over half of their time on teaching, a little over 20% on research, and about 9% on service activities. As in the earlier surveys, in 2005 academic economists report devoting more time to their teaching and less time to their research activities, on average, than the relative weightings they feel their departments and schools assign to these activities, both for annual raises and for promotion and tenure decisions.
Other than a slight decrease in the weightings assigned to research, the relative weightings on teaching, research and service for promotion and tenure decisions changed very 1 The mean values are lower and the numbers of observations are higher here than the basic results reported in Watts and Becker (2006) , because we are focusing on this sub-section of the survey and made some minor adjustments. Specifically, if a respondent reported percentages for the weights on promotion and tenure decisions that totaled 100 but left some of the entries for those variables blank, it seemed clear that the blanks represented a zero response so we replaced the blanks with zeros. We did this same thing for the variables on department weights for annual raise decisions and faculty time allocation percentages. For some variables this increased the number of observations and lowered mean values.
little from 2000 to 2005 in the overall sample. In terms of annual raises, the importance of both teaching and research decreased slightly from 2000 to 2005, perhaps reflecting a general funding environment over that period in which most departments and schools were, in practice if not in word, giving across-the-board raises more often than differentiating on merit. But in general there was very little change in the structure of incentives from 2000 to 2005, and there is still a disproportionate amount of time devoted to teaching as opposed to research and service. As we suggested before (Harter, Becker and Watts 2004) , there are several possible explanations for this pattern: teaching loads and large class sizes (both in absolute terms, and compared to class sizes in other disciplines) may require more time than the mix of time reflected in departmental or school incentives; or additional time spent on research may not reliably lead to more publications, and so have a lower expected return than additional time spent on teaching; or economics instructors at most schools may simply prefer to spend more time on their teaching, rather than doing more research.
Comparing the 1995 and 2000 data, we observed some interesting differences in time allocation and incentive structures for baccalaureate and doctoral institutions. To determine whether these differences still exist, in Table 2 we break down the time allocation and incentive results across different types of institutions using three Carnegie classifications -bachelor's, master's, and doctoral institutions. There were insufficient responses from associate-degreegranting institutions in the 2005 survey to include that as a separate fourth group. Once again, for descriptive purposes only we provide z-statistics for the differences in means for the three survey periods in the appendix, but we make no attempt to draw statistical inferences because of the nature of the data.
[Insert appears that economists at different kinds of schools perceive these kinds of differences emerging in the incentive structures they face, and are changing how they allocate their time in different ways, in response to those incentives. 
